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1Credit Ratings as Coordination Mechanisms
Abstract
In this paper, we provide a novel rationale for credit ratings. The rationale that we propose
is that credit ratings can serve as a coordinating mechanism in situations where multiple equilibria
can obtain. We show that credit ratings provide a “focal point” for ﬁrms and their investors.
We explore the vital, but previously overlooked implicit contractual relationship between a credit
rating agency and a ﬁrm. Credit ratings can help ﬁx the desired equilibrium and as such play
an economically meaningful role. Our model provides several empirical predictions and insights
regarding the expected price impact of ratings changes, the discreteness in funding cost changes,
and the eﬀect of the focus of organizations on the eﬃcacy of credit ratings.
21 Introduction
Credit ratings are quite prevalent in ﬁnancial markets. Most corporate bond issues have at least one
rating, many have two. In fact, the two most prominent ratings agencies — Moody’s and Standard
& Poor’s — adhere to a policy of providing a rating for all taxable corporate bonds publicly issued in
the U.S. For many observers of the ﬁnancial market, credit ratings appear to have real importance,
that is, the common perception is that lower ratings lead to higher funding costs, and vice versa.
However, the ﬁnancial economics literature has cast doubt on the importance of announced changes
in these ratings. A common argument is that the rating change may actually go hand in hand with,
or even more likely follow an informational release and thus may have by itself no informational
content.
The empirical evidence surrounding credit ratings is far from conclusive. In fact, most empirical
studies provide mixed results for the eﬀects of rating changes on stock prices.1 In our view this is
not surprising. What is missing from the literature is an understanding of the way ratings come
about and the role credit ratings actually play in the ﬁnancial markets. From this perspective, we
will show that credit ratings play an economically meaningful role, conﬁrming their increasingly
important role in practice.2
Academics have previously examined credit ratings from an informational content/market ef-
ﬁciency point of view. We believe that credit ratings derive their value much more from two
institutional features. What we show is that credit ratings can serve as “focal points”. By this
we mean that credit ratings help ﬁx the desired equilibrium in environments for which multiple
equilibria would otherwise exist. The ﬁrst key to our theory is the ongoing monitoring role of
credit rating agencies through their credit watch procedures. This is a previously much overlooked
feature of credit rating agencies. Their job is not just the initial information dissemination, but
also the ongoing monitoring aspect through credit watch procedures. Here implicit contracts play
an important role. In particular, a credit rating agency will interact with the ﬁrm that it rates,
1In Section 4.1, we discuss the extant empirical evidence.
2Another illustration of the increased importance of credit ratings is the proliferation of credit risk models. See
Nickell, Perraudin, Varotto (1999), Carey and Hrycay (2000), and Saunders (1999) for some interesting work on this
issue.
3and write implicit contracts with management once potential changes in ﬁrm characteristics and/or
market circumstances threaten to aﬀect its credit rating. The credit rating procedure allows for a
“deal” (implicit contract) between the ﬁrm and credit rating agency where the former promises to
undertake speciﬁc actions to mitigate the possible deterioration of its credit standing (and rating).
We show that the credit rating and associated implicit contract is incentive compatible provided
that a group of (institutional) investors conditions its decisions on the rating. The latter is the
second institutional feature that is important for our theory.
There is ample evidence on the presence of our second institutional feature. Pension fund
guidelines often stipulate that investments are only allowed in highly-rated issues (e.g., those of
investment grade). Dating back to as early as 1936, government regulations in the U.S. have
prohibited various types of ﬁnancial institutions from holding speculative-grade bonds.3 Similarly,
speciﬁc markets, such as the Eurobond market, may simply require the presence of a rating before
listing the debt issue. These rigidities eﬀectively condition the investors’ decisions on the observed
rating.4
In the setting that we analyze, we let ﬁrms that are in need of debt ﬁnancing interact with
the ﬁnancial market. The market cannot readily observe the quality of the ﬁrms’ investment
opportunities. This may induce moral hazard. We show that depending on the beliefs of the
market, the ﬁrm might be induced to choose high-risk or low-risk strategies. For instance, if the
market anticipates a risky project choice, it will demand a high coupon rate in the debt contract.
However, this belief may well be self-fulﬁlling: once the ﬁrm is confronted with the high funding
cost, it will optimally engage in the risky project. Alternatively, the ﬁrm might be induced to
choose the low-risk strategy if that is what the market anticipates. Thus, multiple equilibria may
be present, and depending on which project is ﬁrst best, the equilibrium might be dissipative.
3Cantor and Packer (1997) provide a select list of ratings-based U.S. regulations. For instance, the Congressional
promulgation of the Financial Institution Recovery and Reform Act of 1989 prohibited Savings & Loans from investing
in below-investment-grade bonds. Imposing a higher ratings bar, the SEC amendment to Rule 2a-7 under the
Investment Company Act of 1940 required money market mutual funds to limit holdings of low-rated bonds, where
the minimum rating imposed was A+ (A1).
4Other examples of links between investor behavior and credit ratings are clauses that link particular decisions to
credit ratings. For example, in the case of Enron, the proposed takeover of Dynergy was made contingent on having
an investment grade rating. Moreover, some of Enron’s partnerships required accelerated debt repayments if stock
prices declined signiﬁcantly and a credit rating downgrade to non-investment (speculative) grade status occurred
(International Herald Tribune (2002)).
4What we show in our model is that if a sizable proportion of investors (e.g., pension funds)
follows the credit rating (i.e., bases their investment decisions on the credit rating because of
institutional rigidities), others rationally follow as well. This can resolve the multiple equilibria
problem and points at the focal point role of credit ratings that we develop in this paper.
Our work incorporates some other insights that are brought forward by practice. Practitioners
often claim that credit ratings are deemed essential to access a wider group of investors. Dallas
(1997) argues that,
Among the key beneﬁts, ratings often provide the issuers with an ‘entry’ ticket in public
debt markets, broadening the issuers’ ﬁnancing opportunities.
Issuing bonds to a speciﬁc group of investors or ﬂoating them on a particular market may only be
feasible if a credit rating is present. For example, ratings may help in disseminating information to
relatively uninformed investors. Rating agencies could be seen as information-processing agencies
that may speed up the dissemination of information to ﬁnancial markets. As put forward by
Moody’s, a prominent rating agency:
The ratings are intended to provide investors with an independent, forward-looking
assessment of long-term credit risk according to a globally comparable standard.5
Thus, ratings would act as ‘information equalizer’, thereby enlarging the investor base. Much
of the literature on credit ratings focuses on how, as independent information producers, credit
rating agencies can help disseminate information about ﬁrms to investors.
In our theory, credit ratings have a role as ‘information equalizer’, albeit a more subtle one. In
particular, we will argue that ratings really serve as a focal point in that in the end all investors may
rationally base their investment and pricing decisions on the rating, anticipating that suﬃciently
many will do so. As discussed, institutional rigidities (such as restrictions to hold only investment
grade securities) could make such an equilibrium robust.
The role that credit ratings play in our story has links to the literature on “cheap talk”, such as
Spatt and Srivastava (1991) and Morris (1999). The argument is that a credit rating in the “focal
5See McDaniel (1997).
5point” interpretation only has value because some investors choose to take the announced rating
seriously. In doing so, they aﬀect the funding cost and consequently the behavior of the ﬁrm, which
in turn conﬁr m st h er a t i n g . I fw ea r er i g h t ,a n dw ed ob e l i e v et h a tt h ec o o r d i n a t i o no fb e l i e f s
function of ratings is quite signiﬁcant, ratings may have little informational content but actually be
insurance policies against a bad equilibrium.6 This is consistent with the mixed empirical evidence.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and contains
the basic equilibrium analysis. Section 3 examines credit ratings as a resolution to multiple
equilibria. In Section 4, we extract several empirical predictions and discuss existing empirical
evidence. Section 5 extracts other implications of the analysis, and Section 6 concludes. All proofs
are in the Appendix.
2M o d e l S e t u p
We model an economy in which there are ﬁrms of varying quality seeking debt ﬁnancing from
investors. We assume a perfectly competitive ﬁnancial market. The investment opportunity sets
vary across ﬁrm type, where ﬁrms are either of good (G) quality or they are lemons (L). The prior
probability that a given ﬁrm is good is β ∈ [0,1], and we refer to this β as “market quality”. We
assume universal risk neutrality and a risk-free rate of zero.
2.1 Projects
Each type of ﬁrm has access to at least one type of project. All projects require an investment
of I>0, and neither ﬁrm has any resources available to invest in the project. Instead, ﬁrms
must raise I in debt from investors. We allow good ﬁrms access to two types of projects, a safe
one (S) and a risky one (R). A safe project is risk free and pays oﬀ a positive amount XS with
probability 1. The risky project pays oﬀ a positive amount XR >X S with probability γ,a n dz e r o
6Our focal point interpretation has some similarities to Dow and Rossiensky (1999). They build a model of a
ﬁnancial ﬁrm that ﬁnances itself by issuing risky debt. Financial ﬁrms raise money ﬁr s t ,a n dt h e nc h o o s ew h i c h
assets to hold. Thus, liability structure and investment policy are inextricably linked in that a liability structure
is chosen in anticipation of particular investment opportunities. However, after funds are raised, if the investment
opportunity set has changed, the ﬁnance company is left with a suboptimal asset-liability mix which could induce
multiple equilibria problems. We identify situations in which multiple equilibria might arise as well, but our focus is
on how these can be resolved by credit ratings.
6with probability 1 − γ. We assume that the ﬁrst-best project choice is the safe one in that the
expected value of the safe project exceeds that of the risky project (γXR <X S). Lemon ﬁrms
have access to only the risky (R) project. We assume that both projects have a positive NPV in
that XS > γXR >I.
2.2 Information Structure, Funding Costs and Equilibrium Behavior
The information structure is such that investors cannot contract on the ﬁrm’s project choice as this
is privately known to the ﬁrm. Moreover, project payoﬀsa r eu n o b s e r v a b l e . W i t ht h i ss t r u c t u r e ,i t
can be shown from the work of Townsend (1979), Diamond (1984) and Gale and Hellwig (1985) that
debt is the optimal contract.7 Thus, ﬁrms in our model approach the market for debt ﬁnancing.
Each loan consists of an amount lent (I) to fund the investment. The loan also dictates the
repayment amount due, which we denote Fτ,w h e r eτ ∈ {S,R} represents the market’s conjecture
of the good ﬁrm’s project choice. The lemon ﬁrm only has access to the risky (R) project.
The information structure is such that the market cannot distinguish good ﬁrms from lemons.
The cross-sectional distribution of good borrowers (β) and lemons (1 − β) is public information.
Thus, the repayment amount (Fτ) may depend on the belief (β) over the type of the borrowing ﬁrm
and the conjectured project choice of the good ﬁrm. Since the ﬁnancial market is competitive,
investors are risk neutral and the riskless discount rate is zero, the expected repayment — with
expectations taken over the cross-sectional distribution of good borrowers (β) and lemons (1−β)—
on any loan in equilibrium will be equal to the amount lent. That is, E[Fτ]=I, for all τ ∈ {S,R}
and β ∈ [0,1]. Lemma 1 gives the repayment amounts required by investors.
Lemma 1
Investors condition the terms of the loans they oﬀer based on the conjecture of a good ﬁrm’s
project choice. If investors anticipate that a good ﬁr mw i l lc h o o s et h es a f ep r o j e c t ,t h e yr e q u i r ea
7See Diamond (1992) for a fuller discussion of the optimality of debt contracts in such a setting.
7r e p a y m e n ta m o u n to f
FS =
I
β +[ 1− β]γ
. (1)
Alternatively, if the investors anticipate that a good ﬁrm will choose the risky project, they require





where repayment amount FR >FS.
The results of Lemma 1 are straightforward. The investment behavior of the good ﬁrm has an
important eﬀect on ﬁnancing costs.8 The required repayment is higher if the market anticipates
that a good ﬁrm will choose the risky project over the safe alternative. Moreover, since ﬁrm
type is unobservable by the market, the required debt repayment when the safe project choice is
anticipated by investors depends on the prior belief (β)t h a tt h eﬁrm is good. This is not the case
when the risky project choice is anticipated as the good ﬁr ma n dt h el e m o ne a r ni d e n t i c a le x p e c t e d
payoﬀs in this case. Thus, as the prior belief that the ﬁrm is good increases, the ﬁnancing cost it
faces when investors anticipate the safe project choice strictly declines, but the risky project choice
repayment is unaﬀected.
Given the funding costs derived in Lemma 1, the good ﬁrm’s equilibrium choices are delineated
in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1
The good ﬁrm’s project choices in the set of plausible Bayesian Perfect Nash Equilibria are:9
1. If the prior belief over ﬁrm quality is suﬃciently low such that β < β, the good ﬁrm will
choose the risky project regardless of the market’s beliefs about its anticipated project choice.
2. If the prior belief over ﬁrm quality is suﬃc i e n t l yh i g hs u c ht h a tβ ≥ β, the good ﬁrm will
choose whichever project the market anticipates will be taken. Thus, if the market anticipates
8Recall that lemons have only one project choice; they always choose the risky (R) project.
9Depending on the parameters in the model, either of these two regions could be empty.
8the safe choice, the good ﬁrm optimally chooses the safe project. However, if the market
anticipates the risky project, it is then optimal for the good ﬁrm to choose the risky project in
equilibrium. Hence, there are multiple equilibria in this intermediate β range.
The results of Theorem 1 show that a good ﬁrm’s investment choice in equilibrium depends
on the market’s prior beliefs on the investment choice for a market of suﬃciently high quality
(β ≥ β). If the quality of the market is low (β < β), investor beliefs about the good ﬁrm’s project
choice are unimportant. Here, the lemon problem is so severe that a good ﬁrm will always engage
in asset-substitution moral hazard. That is, the risky project will be chosen even if the market
would anticipate the safe choice. The reason is that the presence of lemons inﬂates the repayment
obligation such that the good ﬁrm has no incentive to invest in the safe project in equilibrium.
Theorem 1 shows that when the quality of the market is suﬃciently high (β ≥ β), multiple
equilibria are possible as investor beliefs over the good ﬁrm’s project choice are paramount in
determining which equilibrium obtains. Within this region, it is optimal for the good ﬁrm to
choose the project that is anticipated by the market. Thus, even though the safe project is the
ﬁrst best and is a feasible outcome in this region of market quality, investor beliefs can drive the
ﬁrm to the undesirable equilibrium where the risky project is chosen. In the remainder of the
paper, we focus on this region where multiple equilibria are possible and seek out resolutions to
this problem.
2.3 Resolving the Multiple Equilibria Problem
In this subsection, we show that if there exists a suﬃciently sizeable subset of investors that believes
good ﬁrms will choose the safe project, the remaining investors will also rationally conjecture that
the safe project will be chosen. In Section 3, we analyze how credit ratings could facilitate such
“coordination” among investors.
The more fundamental issue is what does the investors’ behavior imply for the ﬁrms for which
multiple equilibria exist? As derived in Theorem 1,f o rt h er e g i o nβ ≥ β, good ﬁrms optimally
choose whichever project the market anticipates. However, this result can be generalized. If a
9suﬃciently sizeable subset of investors anticipates the safe project to be chosen, good ﬁrms will in
fact ﬁnd it in their own best interests to choose the safe project, and vice versa.
This observation can be modelled as follows. Let α ∈ [0,1] be the proportion of investors that
anticipates that a particular good ﬁrm always chooses the safe project.10 The remaining 1 − α
proportion of investors simply form their own beliefs over the good ﬁrm’s project choice, but is
aware of the presence of the α investors. What we will show is that if the proportion of investors
“playing” the safe equilibrium (α)i ss u ﬃciently big, the good ﬁrm always picks the safe project
regardless of the conjectures of the remaining 1 − α investors.
Observe that with two diﬀerent investor classes, we can envision the ﬁrms auctioning oﬀ the
debt claim in two tranches. The proportion α of (institutional) investors anticipates the safe
project. This implies that the price of this debt claim is such that FS = I
β+[1−β]γ (see (1)). If the
1 − α investors anticipate that the risky project will be chosen, they require a higher repayment
value, i.e., FR = I
γ (see (2)). The total repayment obligation faced by a good ﬁrm is therefore
given by
Fα = αFS +[ 1− α]FR.( 3 )
It is obvious that for any α ∈ (0,1), Fα ∈ (FS,FR), and that this weighted-average debt-repayment
amount is decreasing in the fraction of investors, α, anticipating the safe project choice (∂Fα
∂α < 0).
Thus, the total funding costs decline as the proportion α increases.
Facing such ﬁnancing costs, the good ﬁrm compares its net expected beneﬁtf r o mc h o o s i n gt h e
safe project to that of the risky project. If it chooses the risky project (as the 1 − α investors




Pr(Risky Project Succeeds) × [XR − Fα]
+Pr(Risky Project Fails) × [0]


 = γ [XR − Fα]. (4)
While if it chooses the safe project, which is risk free, it receives
XS − Fα.( 5 )
10In the next section, we address what could explain why a particular set of investors might play only the good
equilibrium.
10The critical proportion α∗ equates (4) and (5). We can now proceed to our result that formalizes
the impact of the proportion α of investors on the equilibrium.
Theorem 2
For every quality of the market β ≥ β, there exists a critical proportion α∗ of investors that
believe the safe project will be chosen such that for α > α∗, the good ﬁrm will always choose the
safe project. In these cases, the remaining 1 − α investors also rationally assume that the good
ﬁrm chooses the safe project. Hence, ﬁnancing costs are given by FS whenever α > α∗.
What this theorem states is that a signiﬁcant proportion of investors playing the safe equilibrium
can actually guide ﬁrm behavior to the desired (ﬁrst-best) risk choice. The remaining proportion
(1−α) of investors should then rationally anticipate the safe project choice as well. The intuition for
this result is as follows. Investors who anticipate that the good ﬁrm will play the safe equilibrium
will price the debt repayment commensurately. And while there are other investors who may
anticipate that the risky project will be taken, total funding costs are reduced as the proportion
of investors playing the safe equilibrium (α)i n c r e a s e s( i . e . ,∂Fα
∂α < 0). The critical proportion
of investors playing the safe equilibrium (α∗) is simply the proportion of investors that equates
the good ﬁrm’s expected beneﬁts from investing in the safe and the risky project, respectively,
anticipating that the others (1 − α) will anticipate the risky project choice. At any proportion of
such investors above this threshold, the good ﬁrm will always play the safe equilibrium. The beliefs
of these α investors are then fully conﬁrmed in equilibrium, and the remaining 1−α investors now
rationally conjecture the good ﬁrm’s behavior as well. Thus, with both sets of investors anticipating
the safe project choice, total funding costs drop to FS, for all α > α∗.
The prior over ﬁrm quality (β) plays a key role in the formation of this critical proportion α∗
of investors.
11Corollary to Theorem 2
The critical proportion of investors, α∗, such that the good ﬁrm will always choose the safe
project whenever α > α∗, is decreasing in the prior over ﬁrm quality (β).
This Corollary to Theorem 2 states that the minimum proportion of investors playing the safe
equilibrium (α∗) that is necessary to insure the selection of the safe project, is strictly decreasing
in the prior over ﬁrm quality, β. The intuition is similar to that of Theorem 2. As the prior
that the ﬁrm is good increases, the total funding costs (Fα) decline. Since the favorable eﬀect of
an improving prior (higher β) is only relevant if the safe project is chosen, the critical proportion
of investors α∗ decreases. Intuitively, at higher levels of market quality (i.e., average quality of
ﬁrms (β) is higher), asset substitution problems (risky project choices) are smaller. Hence, a lower
threshold α∗ resolves these problems.
3 Credit Ratings as a Resolution to Multiple Equilibria
In this section, we establish what we see as the key role of credit ratings. Central to our theory is
that credit ratings help mitigate the multiple equilibria problem in that the credit ratings serve as
focal points. In our model formulation, this is relevant for the range of ﬁrm qualities where multiple
equilibria are possible (β ≥ β). As emphasized in the Introduction, a key element to our theory
is that institutional rigidities link the actions of some investors to the observed credit ratings and
other investors are aware of the institutional rigidities that some face. The institutional rigidity
we model is that a nonzero proportion of investors acts on the basis of the announced credit rating.
For example, institutional investors make up a sizeable portion of the debt market, but are often
restricted to invest in only highly-rated ﬁrms. Thus, we let the proportion of investors represented
by institutions be given by α. Their investment behavior is therefore (partially) driven by the
announced ratings.
123.1 Interactions Between CRA and the Firm
The immediate question underlying our premise is why some investors — i.e., the institutional
investors — are ever willing to base their investment decisions on the rating? That is, what makes
the credit rating credible?
Recall that the rating as such has no informational content. While it could identify the “good”
equilibrium, the possibility of such an equilibrium was already known to the market. Here it is
crucial to consider the role a credit rating agency plays in practice, and in particular the credit
watch procedure. What has previously been ignored is that a CRA does have regular interactions
with ﬁrms, and engages in implicit contracting with the ﬁrm. How does this work? Whenever
the CRA observes potential changes in ﬁrm characteristics, they will notify management and ask
for clariﬁcation. The rating is then often put “on watch”. The ﬁrm will generally be asked to
provide information on how it is going to deal with the “change”. The CRA and ﬁrm can strike
“a deal” where the ﬁrm promises to undertake speciﬁc actions to mitigate the possibly adverse
consequences of the change. For this, concrete targets with associated deadlines are often set.
During this period the rating continues to be “on watch”. If the ﬁr mm a n a g e st ol i v eu pt ot h i s
implicit contract, the rating may get reconﬁrmed. If not, a downgrade could occur.
A recent example of the dialogue that takes place between CRAs and ﬁrms can be found in
the European telecommunications industry.11 Credit rating downgrades were suﬀered by four
prominent ﬁrms, including British Telecom, France Telecom, Deutsche Telekom, and KPN. These
downgrades came on the heels of several exchanges between various CRAs and these ﬁrms, as seen
by the following quote: “Last September, Moody’s downgraded companies including KPN and
France Telecom and said it would give them 12-18 months to reduce their debt in line with their
new ratings.” Table 1 summarizes the recent history for two other players in this industry.
11See Alice van Duyn and Rebecca Bream, “Credit Rating Agencies Show Their Teeth”, Financial Times,F e b r u a r y
27, 2001, page 28.




Feb 2000 AA plus Aa1
Apr 24 2000 Put on negative watch —
May 4 2000 — Put on negative watch
Aug 24 2000 Cut to A —
Sep 6 2000 — Cut to A2
Feb 16 2001 Put on negative watch —
Deutsche Telekom
Feb 2000 AA minus Aa2
Apr 26 2000 Put on negative watch —
Jun 22 2000 — Put on negative watch
Oct 5 2000 — Cut to A2
Oct 6 2000 Cut to A minus∗ —
* With a negative outlook
The existing credit ratings literature has ignored this interaction between the CRA and the
ﬁrm, and therefore overlooked the “control” that the CRA has over the behavior of the ﬁrm.
Strictly speaking, the actual control comes from the investors that base their investment and
pricing decisions on the credit rating, and in doing so make the implicit contract between the
CRA and ﬁrm incentive compatible. For market participants, this implies that a credit rating
has a potentially valuable contractual feature, even in the absence of an informational advantage.
The examples in Table 1 all point at a “negative watch” qualiﬁcation. This is typical for the
implicit contracts upon which we focus. Credit rating agencies typically contract with ﬁrms on
preventing downgrades. Not surprisingly then, our theory predicts that (ultimate) downgrades
are negative news and have a negative stock market impact, while upgrades may not have a stock
14market impact. The following analysis formulates the process by which credit ratings can serve as
an incentive-compatible, coordination mechanism.
3.2 Credit Ratings in Equilibrium
We assume the existence of a credit rating agency (CRA) that assigns a credit rating (c ∈ {cR,c S})
to the debt claim a ﬁrm is trying to sell to the market. The rating can designate that the issuing
ﬁrm will engage in the risky project (c = cR) or the safe project (c = cS). Since the CRA is not
screening ﬁr m si no u rm o d e l ,t h el e m o n sc o n t i n u et oa ﬀect the borrowing cost FS of the good ﬁrms.
T h ep r e s e n c eo fl e m o n si nt h em a r k e t p l a c ee ﬀectively adds noise and increases the funding cost
regardless of the credit rating assigned by the CRA. Thus, the CRA’s assigned credit rating is not
based on private information, but is based on a promise by the ﬁrm to choose the designated risks.
In addition, institutional investors (α) are restricted to investing in debt issues for which the safe
credit rating is assigned. In what follows, we examine what happens when the CRA assigns these
ratings. In Table 2 we have summarized the sequence of events in the model that now includes
the CRA.
15Table 2: Sequence of Events
At t = 0
1. Nature moves and ﬁrms are either “good” or “lemons” with probabilities β
and 1 − β, respectively
2. Firm needs $I to invest in project (good ﬁrms have access to safe and risky
projects, lemons only have access to risky projects)
3. Debt investors will lend an amount I, and ask for a ﬁxed repayment based on
their conjecture of the good ﬁrm’s project choice. Here, the sequence is:
3.1 The CRA announces either cS or cR (safe or risky) rating
3.2 If cS is announced, institutional α investors are allowed to invest and conjecture
that good ﬁrm will choose safe project. If cR is announced, then α investors abstain
from lending
3.3 Remaining 1 − α investors then form beliefs about ﬁrm’s investment behavior
based on size of α
3.4 Investors (including institutional investors only in the case of cS rating) lend I in
exchange for a ﬁxed repayment based on their beliefs about investment behavior
4. Firm then chooses project based on repayment schedule oﬀered by investors
At t = 1
5. Projects pay oﬀ;s a f ep r o j e c t sp a yo ﬀ XS > 0 for sure, and risky projects pay oﬀ XR >X S
with probability γ (and zero otherwise)
6. Firm repays debt obligation if project payoﬀ is positive, and defaults otherwise
CRA announces Risky Rating
The case where the CRA announces the risky rating is straightforward. Observe that if c = cR,
the proportion of institutional investors is α = 0. These investors can only lend funds if the
safe credit rating is assigned to the ﬁrm’s debt. The non-institutional investors who do not face
any investment restrictions now lack guidance. They will simply play either the good or the bad
16equilibrium, the multiple equilibria problem manifests itself again, and the good ﬁrm will choose
whichever project is anticipated by investors.
CRA announces Safe Rating
If the CRA announces the safe credit rating (cS), institutional investors are in the market. These
investors condition their investment behavior on the credit rating. Here, the result of Theorem
2 plays a key role. If a suﬃcient proportion of institutional investors are present, the good ﬁrm
will optimally choose the safe project. The intuition is analogous to that of Theorem 2.W i t h a
suﬃciently large proportion of institutional investors (conditioning their pricing on the safe credit
rating), the funding cost for the ﬁrm is relatively low. This induces the ﬁrm to choose the safe
project and eﬀectively induces all i n v e s t o r st op r i c ea c c o r d i n gt ot h ea n n o u n c e dc r e d i tr a t i n g . W e
formulate this in the next result.
Theorem 3
If the proportion of institutional investors exceeds α∗ (see Theorem 2), the CRA will engage
in implicit contracting with the ﬁr ma n da n n o u n c eac r e d i tr a t i n gc = cS. The good ﬁrm optimally
chooses the safe project, and all investors will condition their investment and pricing decisions on
this rating.
What this theorem shows is that credit ratings have a role as an incentive-compatible “coordi-
nation mechanism”. The mechanics by which this process works is as follows. The CRA ﬁxes ﬁrm
behavior with its implicit contract, and ﬁrms choose to adhere to this implicit contract because it
rationally anticipates that investors condition their investment and pricing decisions on the rating,
thereby conﬁrming the rating and investor beliefs.
As a ﬁnal observation, note that we have implicitly assumed that if the CRA can add value,
it will do so. The CRA seeks to induce the ﬁrst-best project-choice, and this is the safe project.
While it would be of interest to quantify the potential agency problem with the CRA, it is not the
17focus of our analysis.12
3.3 Impact of Noise and Moral Hazard on Credit Ratings
The focal point story essentially purports credit ratings as an insurance policy against uncoordi-
nated jumps to the bad equilibrium. When is this most valuable? The value of credit ratings
depends on three frictions in the model:
1. the severity of noise, i.e., the mispricing caused by lemons in the model;
2. the moral hazard problem faced by the (good) ﬁr m . T h a ti s ,h o we a s yi si tt oe n g a g ei n
asset substitution? And
3. how divergent and uncoordinated are the beliefs of investors in the market?
The ﬁrst two frictions have a straightforward eﬀect, and can be analyzed within the context
of our model. The severity of noise (i.e., the lemons problem) is represented by the parameter
β. More lemons (lower β) imply a deterioration of the quality of the market, which dampens the
pricing impact of credit ratings. Essentially, noise obscures the role ratings play. The opposite
holds for the severity of the moral hazard problem of the good ﬁrms. More severe asset-substitution
moral hazard (lower γ) increases the funding cost diﬀerential between the two credit ratings. The
next Corollary summarizes these insights.
Corollary to Theorem 3
As the noise becomes more severe (i.e., the cross-sectional proportion of lemons (1 − β)i n -
creases), the funding cost diﬀerential between the cases when the market anticipates the risky and
safe project choices, respectively, strictly decreases. Thus, the diﬀerential between the pricing in
case of a safe, respectively risky, rating decreases. On the other hand, more severe moral hazard
(i.e., lower γ, thus more risk in the risky project) would increase this diﬀerential in pricing.13
12The CRA is an information seller and monitor in one; it is a ﬁnancial intermediary that does not provide funding.
See, for example, Allen (1990), for a model on the incentive compatibility of information sellers.
13More generally, it can be shown that increasing the risk via a mean-preserving spread worsens the credit rating,
and therefore increases the diﬀerential between the funding costs attached to this rating and the good (safe) rating.
18These issues manifest themselves by aﬀecting the funding cost diﬀerential between the risky
and safe project choices. That is, FR − FS increases as β increases and as γ falls. This result is
consistent with the empirical observation that the funding cost diﬀerential between diﬀerent rating
c l a s s e sg o e su pa n dd o w no v e rt i m e . I ti sp a r t i c u l a r l yh i g hi nu n c e r t a i nt i m e s ,i fw ed e ﬁne uncertain
times as periods with increased moral hazard. With respect to the state of the development of
the market (i.e., the amount of noise as inversely measured by β), our model points to an elevated
impact of ratings on funding costs in more well-developed (less noisy) ﬁnancial markets.
With respect to the third friction, the only coordination of investor beliefs that exists in the
model is that among the institutionally-constrained α investors. Obviously, this rigidity may vary
in reality. However, real ﬁnancial markets may also be characterized by some herding behavior
of “free” investors. In particular, analysts may play an important role in forming opinions, and
eﬀectively play a role in coordinating beliefs as well. It would be reasonable to conjecture that
CRAs are most valuable when analyst expectations are divergent. While, strictly speaking, outside
of the context of the model, this would suggest that with divergent analyst expectations, credit
ratings have the biggest pricing impact. It also suggests some degree of substitutability between
the roles CRAs and analysts play.14
Divergence in investor beliefs could be interpreted as another manifestation of uncertain times,
which could put pressure on the coordination role of the CRA. It is not inconceivable that due to
excessive divergence in investors’ beliefs, the implicit contract between the CRA and the rated ﬁrm
cannot be made incentive compatible. So paradoxically, credit ratings may have most added value
when analyst beliefs are very divergent, but beliefs that are too divergent may make it impossible
f o rt h eC R At of o c u sb e l i e f ss u ﬃciently and resolve the multiple equilibria problem. In that case,
credit ratings lose much of their value, thereby causing fragility and multiple equilibria problems
to re-emerge in the ﬁnancial markets.15
14Ederington and Goh (1998) document that both credit rating agencies and stock analysts bring information to
the equity market. They also document that the actions of analysts and rating agencies Granger cause each other,
suggesting that they play complementary roles as well. That is, while bond downgrades are typically preceded by
declining earnings forecasts, actual and forecasted earnings both fall following a bond downgrade.
15It would also be of interest to look at the typical investor base of a ﬁrm. The presence of ratings-dependent
institutional investors is central to our “story”. While endogenous, our work is most relevant for ﬁrms that attract
these institutional investors.
19CRAs thus play a delicate role; if they manage to do their job, they are most valuable in
uncertain times. However, it is precisely in those times that the coordinating role of ratings may
break down.16
4 Existing Evidence and New Empirical Predictions
4.1 Existing Empirical Evidence
An interpretation of the existing empirical evidence has previously provided a rather skeptical view
towards the predictive power of rating agencies, inducing some to question whether ratings have
any value.17 For example, Brealey and Myers (2000) claim that “Firms and governments, having
noticed the link between bond ratings and yields, worry that a reduction in rating will result in
higher interest charges. They almost certainly exaggerate the inﬂuence of the ratings agencies,
who are as much following investor opinion as leading it.” In contrast to such claims, we believe
that a careful reading of the existing empirical evidence in light of our theory gives some value to
ratings.
Early empirical studies of credit ratings, such as West (1973), Liu and Thakor (1984) and
Ederington, Yawitz, and Roberts (1984, 1987), focus primarily on ratings as an explanatory variable
for cross-sectional diﬀerences in yield spreads. Not surprisingly, ratings are found to correlate with
observed yield spreads. This observation, however, was to be expected: ratings and credit risk are
obviously related. More interestingly, later studies seek to discover the empirical impact of rating
changes on security prices. The pervasive ﬁnding in these studies — including Weinstein (1977),
Ederington and Yawitz (1987), Cornell, Landsman, and Shapiro (1989), Hand, Holthausen, and
Leftwich (1992) and Goh and Ederington (1993) — is that there is a signiﬁcant and negative stock
16The incentive compatibility of the implicit contract may also depend on the importance ﬁrms place on having
access to the ﬁnancial market. If the ﬁrm has no need for new funding and its existing debt is unlikely to be repriced
soon, incentive compatibility might be diﬃcult to establish.
17Partnoy (1999) argues that while rating agencies are taken seriously in the market (in particular, a lower rating
can have serious repercussions), this attention is unwarranted. He argues that credit ratings introduce sunspots;
ratings lack information content, and only have value because investors choose to have them aﬀect their beliefs.
Essentially, investors (privately) conjecture that others will let ratings aﬀect their beliefs, and if everyone behaves
as such, ratings will actually alter beliefs. He favors a “new” rating system that relies on market-observed credit
spreads.
20price reaction to bond downgrades, but there is no signiﬁcant reaction to upgrades.
We believe that this evidence is consistent with the rationale we have oﬀered for credit rating
agencies. Speciﬁcally, the implicit contracting that is at the core of our theory is mostly relevant in
situations where the CRA and ﬁrm strike agreements that should prevent (further) downgrades. In
other words, the role CRAs play in practice would make a downgrade a truly informative event as
it implies that the ﬁrm has not complied with the implicit contract during the “on watch” period.
In related empirical work, Kliger and Sarig (2000) further focus on the causality between stock
price movements and rating downgrades. In particular, they design a test that separates ratings
changes from potential (simultaneous) changes in credit standing, and thus seek to resolve the
uncertainty about the causality. Kliger and Sarig (2000) focus on a change in reported credit
ratings categories. This change in “methodology” where a ﬁner partitioning was introduced allows
them to exclusively focus on the informational content of the rating change.18 Their main result
is that (changes in) credit ratings have no statistically signiﬁcant impact on total ﬁrm value, but
do have an eﬀect on the value of outstanding debt with an opposite eﬀect on equity value. In
practice, a higher rating has a positive impact on the value of the debt, but has a negative impact
on the value of equity. For a lower rating, the opposite eﬀects are observed.
What this empirical ﬁnding suggests is that the information content of credit ratings is primarily
linked to (assessing) risk, with only a secondary or negligible informational content for total ﬁrm
value. These ﬁndings are also consistent with our story. The interpretation would be that the
switches between equilibria in our analysis are largely about the level of risk. What this means is
that the overall price impact is limited, as credit rating changes lead to redistributions of wealth
among the ﬁnanciers, consistent with Kliger and Sarig’s (2000) empirical ﬁndings.
4.2 Empirical Predictions
As argued above, the theory that we have developed in this paper is consistent with the existing
empirical evidence. However, there are several additional and empirically-testable predictions that
18Kliger and Sarig (2000) focus on the April 26, 1982 introduction by Moody’s of a ﬁner rating partition. This event
applied to the whole universe of issuers, and could eﬀectively imply a downgrading when put into a low partition, or
an upgrading when put into a relatively high one.
21can be drawn from the model. These predictions follow from the Corollary to Theorem 3 and
the discussion surround this Corollary. In particular, empirical predictions follow from the three
frictions discussed in Section 3.3. That is, the level of noise (“presence of lemons”), the severity
of moral hazard, and the divergence of beliefs among investors. All aﬀect the increase in funding
cost associated with a drop in the rating from the safe to the risky level. Empirical proxies for
each of these three factors can be readily identiﬁed. Noise could be proxied by some variable
measuring the state of development of the ﬁnancial market. The moral hazard problem depends
on the severity of asset substitution problems in a particular industry. This may well be industry
dependent, and most severe in industries where large amounts of risk shifting is possible. The
irreversibility of investments in a particular industry, and/or the ﬁrm’s access to liquidity, could
be reasonable proxies here. The divergence in beliefs can be proxied by the divergence in analyst
earnings forecasts.
5 Implications and Extensions of the Model
In this section, we explore several additional implications of our analysis of credit ratings. These
include the corporate perception that funding costs are discrete, the predictability of ﬁrm behavior,
and the beneﬁts of more transparent ﬁrms.
5.1 Funding Cost Discreteness
Our analysis helps explain discreteness in funding cost. That is, why ﬁrms in practice do not
view their funding costs as being continuous. The presence of a multiple equilibria problem — and
potential switching between equilibria — could introduce discreteness in a ﬁrm’s funding cost. More
speciﬁcally, a rating change in our model can change the ﬁrm’s choice of risk level, and thereby
induce a discrete change in the risk proﬁle, and hence funding cost. The more fundamental lesson
is that credit ratings guide investor beliefs, and that changes in ratings can lead to drastic revisions
in these beliefs.19
19Lizzeri (1999) analyzes the precision of the information communicated by intermediaries. He shows that providing
only yes/no type information (e.g., has the minimum standard been met, yes or no?) can be an optimal strategy.
225.2 Credit Rating Agencies, Fragility and Rumors
Important in our theory are the implicit contracts between ﬁrms and credit ratings agencies. We
could say that credit ratings substitute for other explicit forms of monitoring, and actually could
make ﬁrm behavior more predictable. The idea is that since the credit rating agency examines
and possibly controls the ﬁrm’s choice of risk level, other market participants may rationally reduce
monitoring eﬀorts and hence become less responsive to interim signals regarding the quality of the
claims they hold. Such dependence on credit ratings and reluctance to react to every observable
signal of ﬁrm quality could help reduce the fragility of equilibria.20
In our model, credit ratings provide an economically meaningful role by ﬁxing an equilibrium
when multiple equilibria could otherwise obtain. Observe that in the region where multiple equi-
libria are possible, market rumors could have a serious impact on ﬁrm risk choices as investors
try to anticipate ﬁrm behavior. In this sense, credit ratings may provide some stability by ﬁxing
the equilibrium, implying that market rumors will have a diminished impact on ﬁrm behavior.
The credit rating agency’s implicit contracting feature makes the environment of the ﬁrm more
predictable and facilitates access to ﬁnancial markets. Rumors are consequently more contained.
Similarly, a ﬁrm with a strong reputation may also be less susceptible to the volatility (fragility)
imposed by market rumors as good behavior is anticipated from ﬁrms with strong reputations.
Hence, credit ratings and ﬁrm reputation can have complementary eﬀects in resolving the multiple
equilibria problem. When multiple equilibria are possible, credit ratings can ﬁx the desired equi-
librium if a suﬃcient proportion of institutional investors are present. As we saw in the Corollary
to Theorem 2, this threshold level of institutional (α∗) investors above which the good ﬁrm always
plays the safe equilibrium is strictly decreasing in the prior belief β that the ﬁrm is good. Applying
This type of discrete communication of information (as is common in credit ratings) can also possibly create a discrete
price impact.
20Gale (1993) builds a model of banks that acquire information about borrowers and develop these relationships
over time. However, if a bank were to fail, good borrowers that used this bank are forced to go into the market for
a new bank. If there are limits on the aggregate amount of information processing that can be carried out, good
borrowers face a lemons problem. Congestion of the information system may lead to market failure. Our model,
while not applied directly to banks, purports that credit ratings may help ameliorate such fragility by inducing a
substantial proportion of the providers of capital to ignore interim signals that arise. In a recent paper, Da Rin and
Hellmann (2001) argue that the most important role served by banks has been as coordinating agents that help the
economy achieve the Pareto dominant equilibrium when there are multiple equilibria. In their setting, banks must
be suﬃciently large to both service a critical mass of ﬁrms and possess suﬃcient market power to proﬁtf r o mt h i s .
23our model to a dynamic setting, the prior belief (β) could naturally be interpreted as the posterior
belief about ﬁrm quality, or its reputation. A stronger reputation implies that a lower threshold
level of institutional presence is necessary for credit ratings to serve as focal points and resolve the
multiple equilibria problem.21
5.3 Implications for Focus of Firms
The focal point story necessitates a responsive organization. That is, the threat of a change in
the credit rating (as dictated by the implicit contract) should lead to a change in behavior or to a
particular action by the company. But this responsiveness is not automatic and may depend on
the organizational structure of the ﬁrm. To see this, ﬁrst consider a multi-divisional ﬁrm. In this
type of organization, the impact of a credit rating change, or more generally a change in funding
cost, is diluted at the divisional level. In some sense, divisions free-ride on one another, and see
their choices only partially reﬂected in the ﬁrm’s cost of capital. This would dilute the impact of
credit ratings, unless internal cost of capital allocation systems, such as an EVA (or RAROC) based
system, reestablish the link between the division’s behavior and its true (divisional) cost of capital.
Alternatively, a very centralized ﬁrm, where decisions are made at the top, could mitigate these
concerns. But this type of resolution seems at odds with the perceived importance of decentralized
decision making.22 In the end, however, focus might be important for the eﬀectiveness of credit
ratings as a coordinating device or focal point.
6 Conclusion
Credit ratings are one of the most puzzling features of today’s ﬁnancial markets. Their importance
is evident from the behavior of market participants, however, academic researchers have generally
been skeptical about their importance. In this paper, we have argued that researchers have failed
21Disclosure could play a role as well. In the absence of disclosure, the volatility in the market may prohibit the
CRA from playing its coordination role. That is, the CRA’s ability to focus beliefs may require a minimum level
of disclosure in the market. Along these lines, disclosure may also substitute for credit ratings (e.g., with perfect
disclosure, credit ratings might be superﬂuous). Also the corporate governance structure could play a role. In the
Anglo-Saxon, market-dependent system (i.e., hands-oﬀ), ratings could be more important than in the relationship-
oriented, Continental-European model.
22See Harris and Raviv (1998) for a recent model of intraﬁrm decisionmaking.
24to understand the role credit rating agencies play and have not adequately appreciated the manner
in which credit ratings come about. In particular, we have shown that credit ratings could play a
key role as “focal points” once institutional rigidities are considered.
The analysis shows that credit ratings can coordinate investors’ beliefs. Together with the
implicit contract and monitoring relationship between credit rating agency and ﬁrm, ratings have
a real impact. The analysis produces several empirically-testable predictions that could be taken
to the data, potentially adding to our understanding of the actual credit rating process.
257A p p e n d i x
7.1 Proof of Lemma 1
In our model, we assume that ﬁrm type is not known ap r i o r i . The commonly-held prior belief
that a ﬁrm is good is β, and is a lemon with probability 1−β.L e m o n ﬁrms have access to the risky
project only, whereas good ﬁrms have access to both the safe and the risky project. Consequently,
there are two relevant funding costs to consider. In the ﬁrst case, the market expects the good
ﬁrm to choose the safe project, while in the second case, it expects the good ﬁrm to choose the
risky project. We derive the funding costs for each case below.
Good Firm Chooses Safe Project If investors anticipate that the good ﬁrm chooses the safe
(S) project, they will lend I and require a repayment of FS. Risk-neutral investors require that
E[FS]=I.H e n c e , FS is the solution to
βFS +[ 1− β]γFS = I.
The required debt repayment when investors anticipate that the safe project will be chosen is
FS =
I
β +[ 1− β]γ
.( 6 )
Good Firm Chooses Risky Project If investors alternatively anticipate that the good ﬁrm
will choose the risky project, they will lend I and require a repayment of FR. Again, risk neutral
investors require that E[FR]=I,a n dFR is the solution to
E[FR]=βγFR +[ 1− β]γFR = I.
Since the good ﬁr ma n dt h el e m o na r ei d e n t i c a lw h e nt h eg o o dﬁrm chooses the risky project, the





Lastly, it is easy to observe that FR = I
γ > I
β+[1−β]γ = FS. ¥
267.2 Proof of Theorem 1
We can establish the critical prior belief over ﬁrm quality (β)a st h ep r i o rβ such that the ﬁrm
is indiﬀerent between choosing the safe and risky project when investors anticipate that the safe
project is chosen. Moreover, given that the funding cost when investors anticipate the safe project
to be chosen (FS) is strictly decreasing in β, for all β < β, the good ﬁrm would always prefer the
risky project independent of investor beliefs over investment choice.
With uncertainty over ﬁrm quality, the good ﬁrm faces a funding cost of FS when the market
expects it to choose the safe project. If the good ﬁrm chooses the safe project when facing ﬁnancing
costs of FS, in expectation it receives
XS − FS = XS −
I
β +[ 1− β]γ
.









β +[ 1− β]γ
¸
Hence, β is the value of β that solves
XS −
I





β +[ 1− β]γ
¸
,( 8 )








Now observe that if β = β and the market expects the risky project to be taken, the good
ﬁrm will strictly prefer the risky project. The reason is as follows. If investors instead anticipate
that risky project will be chosen, the good ﬁrm’s expected value upon choosing the safe project
is XS − FR, and that upon choosing the risky project is γ
£
XR − FR¤
.W e c a n c o m p a r e t h e s e
payoﬀs to the left and right hand sides of (8), respectively. Relative to the case where investors
anticipated the safe project choice, the incremental value loss of choosing the safe project now
when facing funding costs of FR is −
£
FS − FR¤







. Thus, when investors anticipate the risky project choice at β = β,
the ﬁrm will strictly prefer the risky project.
27A similar argument veriﬁes that the ﬁrm strictly prefers to invest in the safe project if this
is anticipated by the market for all β > β. Now, to insure that multiple equilibria can obtain
when β ≥ β,i tm u s ta l s ob et h ec a s et h a tt h eg o o dﬁrm will optimally choose the risky project if
investors anticipate this choice. Thus, we must impose the following parametric condition on γ.
The probability that the risky project generates a positive payoﬀ (γ) is such that the good ﬁrm
strictly prefers to choose the risky project when facing funding costs of FR = I
γ. This condition




> γXS − FR.
This can be simpliﬁed to
γ > γ∗ ≡
I +
p
I2 +4 I [XR − XS]
2[XR − XS]
.
We assume that γ > γ∗ for the remainder of the paper.
In summary, if β < β, the good ﬁrm chooses the risky project independent of investor beliefs
over project choice. For β ≥ β, the good ﬁrm optimally chooses whichever project is anticipated
by investors. ¥
7.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Observe that for the good ﬁrm to prefer the safe project when facing funding costs of Fα,i tm u s t
be the case that
XS − Fα > γ [XR − Fα].
It is obvious that while both the left and right hand sides are decreasing in Fα, the left hand side
decreases at a faster rate. This can be seen most clearly by comparing the two extreme cases
of having no investors playing the safe equilibrium (α = 0) in the debt market to having only
investors playing the safe equilibrium (α =1 ) . W h e nα = 0, total funding costs are given by






= FR. Since all investors anticipate the risky
project choice, the good ﬁrm conﬁrms this conjecture in equilibrium and optimally chooses the
risky project since (4) exceeds (5) for funding costs of Fα = FR. The opposite result obtains if







the good ﬁrm optimally invests in the safe project since (5) now exceeds (4).
Thus, for any given β, there exists a critical proportion of investors, α∗, who believe that the
safe project will be chosen such that for α > α∗, the good ﬁrm always chooses the safe project.
Consequently, the remaining 1 − α investors also rationally anticipate the safe project choice and
total funding costs drop to FS. ¥
7.4 Proof of Corollary to Theorem 2
Recall that α∗ is the value of α that equates γ [XR − Fα]a n dXS − Fα,w h e r eFα = αFS +







Since FS is the only variable in the expression for α∗ that is a function of β,a n d∂FS
∂β < 0, we see
directly that ∂α∗
∂β < 0. ¥
7.5 Proof of Theorem 3
The proof of this theorem proceeds in six steps.
1. The credit rating agency “announces” the implicit contract with the ﬁrm and the cS credit
rating.
2. In the ﬁnancial market, the α investors, conditioning on the cS rating, anticipate that the
good ﬁrm will choose the safe project.
3. Based on Theorem 2, the total pricing of the debt claim for α > α∗ is suﬃciently low that
the good ﬁrm optimally chooses the safe project, even if 1 − α investors anticipate the risky
project.
4. Hence, given the ﬁrm’s equilibrium behavior, the remaining 1 − α investors now rationally
anticipate that the good ﬁrm will choose the safe project, and the ﬁrm faces ﬁnancing costs
of FS.
295. The ﬁrm optimally chooses the safe project.
6. Consequently, the beliefs of the α investors are conﬁrmed in equilibrium, thereby making it
optimal for them to condition on credit rating. Moreover, the CRA sees its implicit contract
made incentive compatible (observe that the CRA is “benevolent” in the sense that it plays
its role whenever it adds value). ¥
7.6 Proof of Corollary to Theorem 3
This corollary can be proven by taking the partial derivative of the diﬀerence in funding costs,
given by





β +[ 1− β]γ
,






I [1 − γ]
[β +[ 1− β]γ]
2 > 0.






−βI [β + γ [1 − β][2− γ]]
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